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In R.D. Sorkin’s framework for logic in physics a clear separation is made between the
collection of unasserted propositions about the physical world and the affirmation or denial of
these propositions by the physical world. The unasserted propositions form a Boolean algebra
because they correspond to subsets of an underlying set of spacetime histories. Physical rules
of inference, apply not to the propositions in themselves but to the affirmation and denial
of these propositions by the actual world. This physical logic may or may not respect the
propositions’ underlying Boolean structure. We prove that this logic is Boolean if and only
if the following three axioms hold: (i) The world is affirmed, (ii) Modus Ponens and (iii) If a
proposition is denied then its negation, or complement, is affirmed. When a physical system
is governed by a dynamical law in the form of a quantum measure with the rule that events of
zero measure are denied, the axioms (i) - (iii) prove to be too rigid and need to be modified.
One promising scheme for quantum mechanics as quantum measure theory corresponds to
replacing axiom (iii) with axiom (iv) Nature is as fine grained as the dynamics allows.
I. INTRODUCTION
The view that the mode of reasoning we use for classical physics is not appropriate when
discussing a quantum system is widespread, if not mainstream. For example, in the Quantum
Mechanics volume of his Lectures on Physics, R.P. Feynman refers to “the logical tightrope on
which we must walk if we wish to describe nature successfully” [1]. In order to investigate the
nature of this “tightrope” further, in a systematic way, we need a framework for logic that is
relevant for physics (rather than, say, mathematics or language) and within which the logic used
for classical physics can be identified, characterised, assessed and, if necessary, replaced. Recently, a
unifying foundation for physical theories with spacetime character — Generalised Measure Theory
(GMT) — which provides just such a framework has been set out [2–5]. The key to the clarity
that this formalism brings to the study of deductive inference in physics is the distinction it makes
between the assertion of propositions about the physical world and the propositions themselves,
the latter corresponding merely to questions waiting to be answered [6, 7]. Identifying the answers
to the questions as the physical content of the theory, as explained below, makes it a small step
to consider the possibility of non-standard rules of inference; to do so is to open a new window
on the variety of antinomies with which quantum mechanics is so infamously plagued (or blessed)
2[4, 8–11].
We begin in Section II by identifying three basic structures that constitute a general framework
for reasoning about the physical world. Taking the revolution of relativity seriously, we assume
that the physical theory has a spacetime character in the sense that it is based on a set of spacetime
histories which represent the finest grained descriptions of the system conceivable within the theory.
In Section III we give names to certain rules of inference and situate classical, Boolean rules of
inference within this framework. In Section IV we investigate which rules are implied by which
others, abstractly, by mathematical manipulation alone, setting aside the question of which might
be necessary or desirable for physics. We focus on the rule of inference known as modus ponendo
ponens (modus ponens for short), the basis for deductive proof without which the ability to reason
at all might seem to be compromised from the outset1. We will show that – on the mildest
conceivable assumption that something happens in the world – modus ponens implies Boolean
logic if it is supplemented by the rule “If a proposition is denied by the physical world, then its
negation is affirmed.” These results are independent of whether the theory is classical, quantum
or transquantum in Sorkin’s hierarchy of physical theories [2]. We will show that one currently
favoured scheme for interpreting quantum theory, the multiplicative scheme, coincides with the
adoption of modus ponens, together with a condition of finest grainedness.
II. THE THREE-FOLD STRUCTURE
The details of any logical scheme for physics—in particular, the events about which it is intended
to reason—will plainly depend on the system one has in mind. Nonetheless, one can describe a
class of schemes rather generally in terms of three components [5]:
(i) the set, A, of all questions that can be asked about the system;
(ii) the set, S, of possible answers to those questions; and
(iii) a collection, A∗, of answering maps φ : A → S, exactly one of which corresponds to the
physical world.
While such a framework may not be the most general that could be conceived, it is broad enough
to encompass all classical theories, including stochastic theories such as Brownian motion. In such
a classical physical theory A is a Boolean algebra, S = Z2 = {0, 1} and φ is a homomorphism
from A into Z2, as we describe below. To make the framework general enough to include quantum
theories one might consider altering any or all of these three classical ingredients. It is remarkable
that the only change that appears to be necessary in order to accommodate quantum theories in
a spacetime approach based on the Dirac–Feynman path integral is to free φ from the constraint
that it be a homomorphism [4, 5, 7]. We will assume the following about the three components.
1 Lewis Carroll gives in [12] a witty account of the implications of a failure to take up modus ponens explicitly as a
rule of inference.
3(i) A is a Boolean algebra, which we refer to as the event algebra. The elements of A are
equivalently and interchangeably referred to as propositions or events, where it is understood
that these terms refer to unasserted propositions. An event A can also be thought of as
corresponding to the question, “Does A happen?”. The elements of A are subsets of the set,
Ω, of spacetime histories of the physical system. For instance, in Brownian motion Ω is the
set of Wiener paths. Use of the term ‘event’ to refer to a subset of Ω is standard for stochastic
processes. In the quantal case, Ω is the set of histories summed over in the path integral,
for example the particle trajectories in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. An example of
an event in that case is the set of all trajectories in which the particle passes through some
specified region of spacetime.
The Boolean operations of meet ∧ and join ∨ are identified with the set operations of in-
tersection ∩ and union ∪, respectively. A note of warning: using in this context the words
and and or to denote the algebra elements that result from these set operations can lead to
ambiguity. In this paper we will try to eliminate the ambiguity by the use of single inverted
commas, so that ‘A or B’ denotes the event A ∨B; ‘A and B’, the event A ∧B.
The zero element ∅ ∈ A is the empty set and the unit element 1 ∈ A is Ω itself. The operations
of multiplication and addition of algebra elements are, respectively,
AB := A ∩B, ∀A,B ∈ A;
A+B := (A \B) ∪ (B \ A), ∀A,B ∈ A .
With these operations, A is an algebra in the sense of being a vector space over the finite
field Z2. A useful expression of the subset property is: A ⊆ B ⇔ AB = A. We have, for all
A in A,
AA = A; (1)
A+A = ∅; and (2)
¬A := Ω \A = 1+A . (3)
The event 1 + A may be referred to as ¬A, as the complement of A, or again with single
inverted commas, as ‘not A’2.
(ii) Together with the algebra of questions comes the space of potential answers that the physical
system can provide to those questions. Whilst one can envisage any number of generalisations,
with intermediate truth values for example, we follow Sorkin and keep as the answer space
that of classical logic, namely the Boolean algebra Z2 ≡ {0, 1} ≡ {false, true} ≡ {no, yes}.
To answer the question A ∈ A with 1 (0) is to assert that the event A does (does not) happen;
equivalently, we say that A is affirmed (denied).
2 See [6] for a discussion of the ambiguity in the phrase “not A”.
4(iii) Finally, one has the set A∗ of allowed answering maps, also called co-events3, φ : A → Z2.
We assume that a co-event is a non-constant map: φ 6= 0 and φ 6= 1. That is, a co-event
must affirm at least one event and deny at least one event. To specify a co-event is to answer
every physical question about the system, and thus to give as complete an account of what
happens as one’s theory permits. The physical world corresponds to exactly one co-event
from A∗. In other words, the physical world provides (or is equivalent to) a definite answer
to every question and A∗ is the set of possible physical worlds.
This three-fold structure of event algebra A, answer space Z2 and collection of answering maps or
co-events φ : A → Z2 makes sense out of possibilities that seem otherwise non-sensical [6]. The
three-fold structure is appropriate to physics, where perfectly sensible, meaningful events are not
in themselves true or false (unlike, for example and on one view, mathematical statements). Each
event will either happen or not in the physical world, but which it is is contingent.
This seems an appropriate point to note that the three-fold structure is also apparent in the
framework for interpreting quantum physics that came commonly to be known as “Quantum
Logic.” There are major differences with Sorkin’s framework however. In place of the Boolean
algebra of propositions there is in Quantum Logic an orthocomplemented lattice of subspaces of a
Hilbert space. In place of the set of yes/no answers Z2, there is the set of probabilities, real numbers
between 0 and 1. And in place of the co-event, there is the state which maps each subspace of
Hilbert space to a probability. Thus, at the very outset, the space of propositions in Quantum
Logic has a non-Boolean character due to the focus on Hilbert space as the arena for the physics.
Quantum Logic sprang from a canonical approach to quantum theory in which Hilbert space is
fundamental. Hilbert space has no place in classical physics, hence the starting point – the set
of unasserted propositions – for Quantum Logic is different than in classical physics. In contrast,
in a path integral approach to quantum physics as adopted by Sorkin, the axiomatic basis is a
set of spacetime histories just as it is in classical physics and therefore the structure of the set
of unasserted propositions is the same in both classical and quantum physics: this is a unifying
framework.
III. RULES OF INFERENCE
If we somehow came to know the co-event that corresponds to the whole universe, then there
would be no need for rules of inference: we would know everything already. Rules of inference
are needed because our knowledge is partial and limited and to extend that knowledge further we
need to be able to deduce new facts from established ones. As stressed by Sorkin, on this view
dynamical laws in physics are rules of inference [7]: using the laws of gravity, we can infer from
the position of the moon tonight its position yesterday and its position tomorrow.
3 The notation A∗ reflects the nature of the co-event space as dual to the event algebra.
5For the purposes of this paper we call any condition restricting the collection of allowed co-
events a rule of inference4. One could begin by considering the set of all non-constant maps from
A into Z2; a rule of inference is then any axiom that reduces this set. One axiom that has been
suggested [4, 5] is that of preclusion, the axiom that an event of zero measure is denied. Explicitly,
if µ is the (classical, quantum or transquantum) measure on the event algebra, encoding both the
dynamics and the initial conditions for the system, then µ(A) = 0⇒ φ(A) = 0. We will return to
preclusion in a later Section; for the time being, our attention will focus on rather more structural
axioms.
First, let us define some properties of co-events that it might be desirable to impose. In all the
following definitions, φ is a co-event and we recall that φ is assumed not to be the zero map or
unit map. We begin with properties that reflect the algebraic structure of A itself.
Definition 1. φ is zero-preserving if
φ(∅) = 0 . (4)
Definition 2. φ is unital if
φ(1) = 1 . (5)
One could call this condition “the world is affirmed.”
Definition 3. φ is multiplicative if
φ(AB) = φ(A)φ(B), ∀A,B ∈ A . (6)
Definition 4. φ is additive or linear if
φ(A+B) = φ(A) + φ(B), ∀A,B ∈ A . (7)
A further set of conditions is motivated directly as the formalisation of the rules of inference
that we use in classical reasoning. As mentioned in the Introduction, arguably the most desirable
among these is modus ponens, commonly stated thus:
MP: If A implies B and A, then B.
However, it is now easy to appreciate why care must be taken in distinguishing (mere unasserted)
events from statements about the physical world, i.e. affirmed or denied events. The rules of
inference we are interested in here are those that tell us how to deduce statements about what
happens in the physical world from other such statements. To render modus ponens fully in terms
of the three-fold framework for physics, we re-express it as
MP: If ‘A implies B’ is affirmed and A is affirmed, then B is affirmed,
4 An alternative is to call any condition on the allowed co-events a dynamical law.
6where ‘A implies B’ is an event, an element of A which we denote symbolically as A → B :=
¬(A ∧ (¬B)). We have,
A→ B = 1+A(1+B)
= 1+A+AB, (8)
which small manipulation shows, incidentally, how much easier it is to work with the arithmetic
form of the operations than with ∧, ∨ and ¬. The condition of modus ponens is then:
Definition 5. φ is MP if
φ(A→ B) = 1 , φ(A) = 1 ⇒ φ(B) = 1, ∀A,B ∈ A . (9)
Distinct from MP and from each other are the two strains of “proof by contradiction,” which
we shall call C1 and C2. In words, we can state them as follows:
C1: If event A is affirmed, then its complement is denied.
C2: If event A is denied, then its complement is affirmed
We point out that C1 and C2 are referred to as the law of contradiction and the law of the excluded
middle, respectively, in [13]. While closely related, these two notions are distinct and play a very
different role in our analysis, with C2 being more important. As we will see in the next sections,
C2 plays a complementary role to other conditions (MP, multiplicativity), while C1 is implied from
those conditions5. Formally:
Definition 6. φ is C1 if
φ(A) = 1 ⇒ φ(1+A) = 0, ∀A ∈ A. (10)
Definition 7. φ is C2 if
φ(A) = 0 ⇒ φ(1+A) = 1, ∀A ∈ A. (11)
A. An example: classical physics, classical logic
In classical physics we use classical logic because, in classical physics, One History Happens.
Indeed, the rules of inference known collectively as classical, Boolean logic follow from the axiom
that the physical world corresponds to exactly one history in Ω [5]. In a later Section we will give a
list of equivalent forms of this axiom in the case of finite Ω; here, we note only that if the physical
5 Note also, that at the level of the Boolean algebra of events we always have ¬¬A = A and, moreover, if we take
“law of the excluded middle” to mean that every event is either affirmed or denied then our three-fold framework
respects it by fiat because that is just the statement that φ is a map to Z2 [6]. This illustrates how careful one
must be to be clear.
7world corresponds to history γ ∈ Ω then all physical questions can be answered. In other words, γ
gives rise to a co-event γ∗ : A→ Z2, as
γ∗(A) =


1 if γ ∈ A
0 otherwise,
(12)
∀A ∈ A .
It can be shown that such a γ∗ is both multiplicative and additive, i.e. it is a homomorphism
from A into Z2. It is easy to see that γ
∗ is zero-preserving and unital, and one can further use its
homomorphicity to prove it is C1, C2 and MP. For example, we have
Lemma 1. If co-event φ is additive and unital then it is zero-preserving, C1 and C2.
Proof. Let φ be additive and unital. Then
1 = φ(1) = φ(1+A+A) = φ(1+A) + φ(A), ∀A ∈ A ,
which implies that exactly one of φ(1 + A) and φ(A) is equal to 1. So φ is C1 and C2, and
φ(∅) = 0.
If One History Happens, as in classical physics, the physical world fully respects the Boolean
structure of the event algebra, and the logical connectives, and, or, not and so forth may be used
carelessly, without the need to specify whether they refer to asserted or to unasserted propositions.
One doesn’t have to mind one’s logical Ps and Qs over (potentially ambiguous) statements such as
“A or B happens” when φ is a homomorphism:
Lemma 2. If co-event φ is a homomorphism then φ(A ∨B) = 1 ⇐⇒ φ(A) = 1 or φ(B) = 1.
Proof.
φ(A ∨B) = 1
⇐⇒ φ(AB +A+B) = 1
⇐⇒ φ(A)φ(B) + φ(A) + φ(B) = 1
⇐⇒ (φ(A) + 1)(φ(B) + 1) = 0 .
So no ambiguity arises because ‘A or B’ happens if and only if A happens or B happens.
IV. RESULTS
Theorem 1. The following conditions on a co-event φ are equivalent:
(i) φ is MP and unital;
8(ii) φ−1(1) := {A ∈ A | φ(A) = 1} is a filter6;
(iii) φ is multiplicative.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii)
Let φ be MP and unital.
First, we show that the superset of an affirmed event is affirmed. Let φ(A) = 1 and B be such
that AB = A. Then
φ(A→ B) = φ(1 +A+A)
= φ(1)
= 1,
by unitality. By MP it follows that φ(B) = 1.
Now we show that the intersection of two affirmed events is also affirmed. Let φ(C) = φ(D) = 1.
We have that D(C → CD) = D(1 + C + CD) = D, and so φ(D(C → CD)) = 1. By the first
part of the proof, this implies that φ(C → CD) = 1, so that by MP φ(CD) = 1.
Finally, φ is unital so φ−1(1) is non-empty and φ 6= 1 so φ−1(1) is not equal to A.
(ii) ⇒ (iii)
Let φ−1(1) be a filter and A,B ∈ A. Then there are two cases to check.
(a) If φ(A) = φ(B) = 1 then the filter property implies that φ(AB) = 1.
(b) Assume without loss of generality that φ(A) = 0. Since A is a superset of AB, we must
therefore have that φ(AB) = 0; otherwise, the filter property would lead to the conclusion
that φ(A) = 1: a contradiction.
So φ is multiplicative.
(iii) ⇒ (i)
Let φ be multiplicative. Since φ 6= 0, ∃X ∈ A s.t. φ(X) = 1. Then,
1 = φ(X) = φ(1 ·X) = φ(1)φ(X) = φ(1),
so φ is unital.
Now suppose φ(A) = φ(A→ B) = 1. We have that A(A→ B) = A(1+A+AB) = AB, and thus
φ(AB) = φ(A)φ(A→ B) = 1. It follows that φ(A)φ(B) = 1, so that φ(B) = 1. So φ is MP.
Note, however, the following.
6 We assume a filter is non-empty and not equal to the whole of A.
9Remark. MP alone is not enough to guarantee multiplicativity, as shown by the following example.
Consider the event algebra A = {∅,1}, and the co-event
φ(∅) = 1;
φ(1) = 0.
MP is trivially satisfied: φ(∅ → 1) = φ(1 + ∅ + ∅) = φ(1) = 0, while φ(1 → ∅) = φ(1 + 1 + ∅) =
φ(∅) = 1, but φ(1) = 0. So there is no pair of events A and B such that φ(A → B), φ(A) = 1,
i.e. for which we even need to check whether φ(B) = 1. Multiplicativity fails, however:
φ(∅ · 1) = φ(∅) = 1
6= φ(∅)φ(1) = 1 · 0 = 0.
Neither does MP together with zero-preservation guarantee multiplicativity, as demonstrated again
by an example. Consider this time the four-element event algebra A = {∅, A,B,1}, where B =
1+A, and the following zero-preserving co-event:
φ(∅) = φ(B) = φ(1) = 0;
φ(A) = 1.
MP is trivially satisfied by an argument similar to that above, but φ is not multiplicative, since
φ(A · 1) = φ(A) = 1
6= φ(A)φ(1) = 1 · 0 = 0.
Having established the relation between multiplicativity of a co-event and the pillar of classical
inference—MP—what can be said of the proofs by contradiction? From the proof of Theorem 1
we know that a multiplicative φ is unital. It is also C1:
Lemma 3. If φ is a multiplicative co-event then φ is zero-preserving and C1.
Proof. Let φ be multiplicative. φ 6= 1, so ∃A ∈ A s.t. φ(A) = 0. Thus
φ(∅) = φ (A(1+A)) = φ(A)φ(1 +A) = 0 .
Now let φ(B) = 1 for some B ∈ A. Then
0 = φ(∅) = φ (B(1+B)) = φ(B)φ(1+B)
⇒ φ(1+B) = 0 .
Corollary 1. If the co-event φ is MP and unital then it is C1.
It was shown in the previous Section that if a co-event φ is a homomorphism then it is MP, C1
and C2. Conversely, we can ask: what conditions imply that φ is a homomorphism?
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Theorem 2. If co-event φ is unital, MP and C2 then it is a homomorphism.
Proof. Let φ be unital, MP and C2. By Theorem 1 φ is multiplicative, and by Lemma 3 it is C1.
We need to show that φ is additive. C1 and C2 imply φ(X) + φ(1+X) = 1 for all X ∈ A. Let
A,B ∈ A.
φ(A+B) + φ(1+A+B) = 1 and φ(AB) + φ(1+AB) = 1
⇒ [φ(A+B) + φ(1+A+B)] [φ(AB) + φ(1+AB)] = 1
⇒φ(A+B)φ(AB) + φ(A+B)φ(1+AB) + φ(1+A+B)φ(AB) + φ(1+A+B)φ(1+AB) = 1
⇒φ ((A+B)AB) + φ ((A+B)(1+AB)) + φ ((1+A+B)AB) + φ ((1+A+B)(1+AB)) = 1
⇒φ(∅) + φ(A+B) + φ(AB) + φ(1+A+B +AB) = 1
⇒ 0 + φ(A+B) + φ(AB) + φ ((1+A)(1+B)) = 1
⇒φ(A+B) + φ(AB) + φ(1+A)φ(1+B) = 1
⇒φ(A+B) + φ(AB) + (1 + φ(A))(1 + φ(B)) = 1
⇒φ(A+B) + φ(AB) + 1 + φ(A) + φ(B) + φ(AB) = 1
⇒φ(A+B) = φ(A) + φ(B).
Since zero-preservation and C2 imply unitality we can replace the condition of unitality by that
of zero-preservation:
Corollary 2. If co-event φ is zero-preserving, MP and C2 then it is a homomorphism.
Theorem 2 establishes that, as long as φ(1) = 1 (the world is affirmed), modus ponens needs
the addition of only the rule C2 to lead to classical logic.
V. A UNIFYING PROPOSAL
A. Classical physics revisited
We mentioned that when One History Happens, the corresponding co-event is a homomorphism.
What about the converse? When the set of spacetime histories Ω is finite, the event algebra A is the
power set 2Ω of Ω, and in this case the Stone representation theorem tells us that the set of (non-
zero) homomorphisms from A to Z2 is isomorphic to Ω. Thus, the axiom that exactly one history
from Ω corresponds to the physical world is equivalent—in the finite case—to the assumption that
the co-event that corresponds to the physical world is a homomorphism. This is just one of the
possible equivalent reformulations of the One History Happens axiom that defines classical physics;
we provide a partial list below. Before doing so we must first introduce classical dynamics as a rule
of inference. The dynamics are encoded in a probability measure µ, a non-negative real function
µ : A → R which satisfies the Kolmogorov sum rules and µ(1) = 1. We call an event in A such
11
that µ(A) = 0 a null event. Classical dynamical law requires that the history that corresponds to
the physical world not be an element of any null event: a null event cannot happen. The co-event
φ that corresponds to the physical world is therefore required to be preclusive, where
Definition 8. A co-event φ is preclusive if
µ(A) = 0⇒ φ(A) = 0, ∀A ∈ A . (13)
We will also make use of the following definitions:
Definition 9. A filter F ⊆ A is preclusive if none of its elements are null.
Definition 10. An event A ∈ A is stymied if it is a subset of a null event.
The physical world in a classical theory when Ω is finite is then described equivalently by any
of the following.
(i) A single history, an element of Ω, which is not an element of any null event.
(ii) A minimal non-empty non-stymied event (ordered by inclusion).
(iii) A preclusive ultrafilter on Ω.
(iv) A maximal preclusive filter (ordered by inclusion).
(v) A preclusive homomorphism φ : A→ Z2.
(vi) A preclusive co-event for which all classical, Boolean rules of inference hold.
(vii) A preclusive, unital, MP, C2 co-event.
(viii) A minimal preclusive, multiplicative co-event, where minimality is in the order
φ1  φ2 if φ2(A) = 1⇒ φ1(A) = 1 . (14)
(ix) A minimal preclusive, unital, MP co-event, where again minimality is in the order (14).
The equivalence of item (vii) is the import of Theorem 2. The final two items (viii) and (ix)
introduce the concept of minimality, which is a finest grainedness condition or a Principle of
Maximal Detail: nature affirms as many events as possible without violating preclusion. That the
conditions in (viii) imply that φ is a homomorphism is proved by Sorkin [6, 7]. That (viii) and (ix)
are equivalent is the import of Theorem 1.
In a classical theory one is free to consider any or all of these as corresponding to the physical
world, since each is equivalent to a single history γ ∈ Ω.
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B. Quantum Measure Theory
Quantum theories find their place in the framework of GMT at the second level of a countably
infinite hierarchy of theories labelled by the amount of interference there is between histories [2].
A quantum measure theory has the three-fold structure described in Section II, just as a classical
theory does, and it too is based on a set Ω of spacetime histories—the histories summed over in the
path integral for the theory. The departure from a classical theory is encoded in the nature of the
measure µ which is in general no longer a probability measure. Indeed, given by the path integral,
a quantal µ does not satisfy the Kolmogorov sum rule but, rather, a quadratic analogue of it [2–4].
The existence of interference between histories means that there are quantum measure systems for
which the union of all the null events is the whole of Ω. Examples are the three–slit experiment [4],
the Kochen–Specker antinomy [14, 15], [8, 9] and the inequality–free version of Bell’s theorem due
to Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger [16, 17] and Mermin [18, 19] [11]. The condition of preclusion
therefore runs into conflict with the proposal that the physical world corresponds to a single history
since if every history is an element of some null event there is no history that can happen: reductio
ad absurdum.
Choosing to uphold preclusion as a dynamical law means therefore that of the above list of 9
equivalent descriptions of a classical physical world (i) fails in the quantal setting, and so do (iii),
(v), (vi) and (vii). However, the other 4 — (ii), (iv), (viii) and (ix) — survive and remain mutually
equivalent for a finite quantal measure theory. That (ii), (iv) and (viii) are equivalent can be shown
using the fact that a multiplicative co-event φ defines and is defined by its support, F (φ) ∈ A, the
intersection of all those events that are affirmed by φ:
F (φ) :=
⋂
S∈φ−1(1)
S . (15)
Adopting (viii) as the axiom for the possible co-events of a theory gives the resulting scheme
its name: the multiplicative scheme. The multiplicative scheme is a unifying proposal: whether
classical or quantum, the physical world is a minimal preclusive multiplicative co-event [5]. What
we have shown here is that it could just as well be dubbed the “modus ponens scheme”.
VI. FINAL WORDS
With hindsight, we can see that the belief that the geometry of physical space was fixed and
Euclidean came about because deviations from Euclidean geometry at non-relativistic speeds and
small curvatures are difficult to detect. In a similar vein, Sorkin suggests, the need for deviations
from classical rules of inference about physical events lay undetected until the discovery of quantum
phenomena (see however [6]). That’s all very well, but it could seem much harder to wean ourselves
off the structure of classical logic than to give up Euclidean geometry. To those who feel that
classical rules of inference are essential to science this reassurance can be offered: in GMT classical
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rules of inference are used to reason about the co-events themselves, because a single co-event
corresponds to the physical world.
Moreover, in the multiplicative scheme (to the extent that the finite system case is a good guide
to the more general, infinite case) each co-event can be equivalently understood in terms of its
support—a subset of Ω. In Hartle’s Generalised Quantum Mechanics [20, 21], this subset would be
called a coarse–grained history ; the proposal of the multiplicative scheme is to describe the physical
world as a single coarse–grained history. The altered rules of inference in the multiplicative scheme
for GMT are no more of a conceptual leap than this: the physical world is not as fine grained as
it might have been, and there are some details which are missing, ontologically. Furthermore, the
results reported here reveal the alteration of logic in the multiplicative scheme to be the mildest
possible modification: keeping MP and relinquishing only C2. Relinquishing C2 in physics means
allowing the possibility that an electron is not inside a box and not outside it either. Another
example is accepting the possibility that a photon in a double slit experiment does not pass through
the left slit and does not pass through the right slit. At the level of electrons and photons, such a
non-classical state of affairs is not too hard to swallow; indeed, very many, very similar statements
are commonly made about the microscopic details of quantum systems. The multiplicative scheme
for GMT is a proposal for making precise the nature of Feynman’s “logical tightrope” and raises
the important question: “Are violations of classical logic confined to the microscopic realm?”.
Answering this question becomes a matter of calculation within any given theory [7].
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